ABSTRACT
INTRODUCTION
Public key cryptography has several practical applications, for example in e-commerce systems for authentication (electronic signatures) and for secure communication. The most widely used cryptosystems RSA and ECC (elliptic curve cryptosystems) are based on the problems of integer factorisation and discrete logarithm respectively. Integer factorisation and discrete logarithm problems are only believed to be hard but no proof is known for their NPcompleteness or NP-hardness. Improvements in factorisation algorithms and computation power demand larger bit size in RSA key which makes RSA less efficient for practical applications. Although RSA and ECC have some drawbacks, they are still not broken. But in 1999 [1] Peter Shor discovered the polynomial time algorithm for integer factorization and computation of discrete logarithm on quantum computers. Thus once we have quantum computers in the range of 1,000 bits, the cryptosystems based on these problems can no longer be considered secure. So, there is a strong motivation to develop public key cryptosystems based on problems which are secure on both conventional and quantum computers. Multivariate cryptography is based on the problem of solving nonlinear system of equations over finite fields which is proven to be NP-complete. Quantum computers do not seem to have any advantage on solving NP-complete problems, so multivariate cryptography can be a viable option applicable to both conventional and quantum computers. MIC*, the first practical public key cryptosystem based on this problem was proposed in 1988 [5] by T. Matsumoto and H. Imai. The MIC* cryptosystem was based on the idea of hiding a monomial by two invertible affine transformations. This cryptosystem was more efficient than RSA and ECC. Unfortunately this cryptosystem was broken by Patarin in 1995 [6] . In 1996 [7] Patarin gave a generalisation of MIC* cryptosystem called HFE, however in HFE the secret key computation was not as efficient as in the original MIC* Cryptosystem. The basic instance of HFE was broken in 1999 [9] . The attack uses a simple fact that every homogeneous quadratic multivariate polynomial has a matrix representation. Using this representation a highly over defined system of equations can be obtained which can be solved by a new technique called relinearization [9] . Patarin [8] investigated whether it is possible to repair MIC* with the same kind of easy secret key computations. He designed some cryptosystems known as Little Dragon and Big Dragon with multivariate polynomials of total degree 2 and 3 respectively in plaintext and cipher text variables in public key with efficiency comparable to MIC*. Due to its efficiency and quadratic public key size, the Little Dragon Scheme was more interesting, however Patarin found [8] , [3] that Little Dragon Scheme is insecure. Some more multivariate public key cryptosystems can be found in reference [11] and [12] . For a brief introduction of multivariate cryptography we refer to the interested readers to reference [13] . An interesting introduction of hidden monomial cryptosystems can be found in reference [3] .
Designing secure and efficient multivariate public key cryptosystems continues to be a challenging area of research in recent years. In this paper we present Little Dragon Two, a modified and secure version of Little Dragon cryptosystem. Like Dragon cryptosystems the public key in our cryptosystem is of mixed type but of degree two in plaintext and cipher text variables. The efficiency of our public key cryptosystem is equivalent to that of Little Dragon cryptosystem. The complexity of encryption or signature verification is equivalent to other multivariate public key cryptosystems that is O(n 3 ) where n is the bit size. In decryption or in signature generation we need only one exponentiation in finite field 2 n F and this result in much faster decryption and signature generation. The outline of our paper is as follows. In section 2 we present our cryptosystem and in section 3 we give the security analysis of our cryptosystem. In section 4 we discuss its efficiency.
THE CRYPTOSYSTEM LITTLE DRAGON TWO
Let p be a prime, n be a positive integer, and q F be the As a consequence of above lemmas we can deduce the following lemma, which we will use to design our public key cryptosystem.
Lemma 2.3
The polynomials 
Public key generation
For the public key cryptosystem we cannot take all the permutation polynomials of the form ( ) 
Secret Key
The invertible affine transformations ( , ) s t and finite field element α are secret keys.
Encryption
If Bob wants to send a plaintext message 
Decryption
Here we describe the decryption algorithm. 
THE SECURITY OF THE PROPOSED CRYPTOSYSTEM
In this section we discuss the security of the proposed cryptosystem. In general it is very difficult to prove the security of a public key cryptosystem. For example if the public modulus of RSA is decomposed into its prime factors then the RSA is broken. However it is not proved that breaking RSA is equivalent to factoring its modulus. In this section we will give some security arguments and evidence that our cryptosystem is secure. We are using the polynomial ( ) ∑ then some coefficients will be 0 and 1 and some coefficients will be function ofα .
Since α is secret so most of the coefficients of this polynomial are also secret. One important point is that the degree d of this polynomial is not constant but it is function of n as m = (n + 1)/2. It is easy to see that Linearization Equation attack of [6] is not applicable to our cryptosystem. The Coppersmith-Patarin attack on Little Dragon cryptosystem [3] is due to the using monomial n x to design the little dragon cryptosystem so this attack is also not applicable to our cryptosystem. The attacks discussed in this section are Gröbner basis, univariate polynomial representation, and Differential cryptanalysis, and Relinearization, XL and FXL algorithms.
Attacks with Differential Cryptanalysis
Differential cryptanalysis has been successfully used earlier to attack the symmetric cryptosystem. In recent years differential cryptanalysis has emerged as a powerful tool to attack the multivariate public key cryptosystems too. In 2005 [14] Fouque, Granboulan and Stern used differential cryptanalysis to attack the multivariate cryptosystems. The key point of this attack is that in case of quadratic polynomials the differential of public key is a linear map and its kernel or its rank can be analysed to get some information on the secret key. For any multivariate quadratic function G: [16] have completely broken all versions of the SFLASH signature scheme proposed by Patarin, Courtois, and Goubin [15] . In our cryptosystem instead of using monomial of the form , Substituting the cipher text gives quadratic plaintext variables but in that case it will be different for different cipher texts. So to attack our cryptosystem by the methods of [14] and [16] is not feasible.
Univariate polynomial representation of Multivariate Public Polynomials
In our cryptosystem the encryption function is 
Gröbner Basis Attacks
After substituting the cipher text in public key one can get n quadratic equations in n variables and then Gröbner basis techniques can be applied to solve the system. The classical algorithm for solving a system of multivariate systems is Buchberger's algorithm [4] . Although it can solve all the multivariate quadratic equations in theory its complexity is exponential in the number of variables. We remark that there is no closed form-formula for its complexity. In the worst case the Buchberger's algorithm is known to run in double exponential time and on average its running time seems to be single exponential (see [17] ). There are some efficient variants F 4 and F 5 of Buchberger's algorithm given by Jean-Charles Faugere (see [19] and [20] ). The complexity of computing a Gröbner basis by Buchberger's algorithm for the public polynomials of the basic HFE scheme is too high to be feasible. However it is completely feasible using the algorithm F 5 . The complexities of solving the public polynomials of several instances of the HFE using the algorithm F 5 are provided in [10] . Moreover it has been expressed in [10] "a crucial point in the cryptanalysis of HFE is the ability to distinguish a randomly algebraic system from an algebraic system coming from HFE". Moreover our public key is of mixed type, this mean for different cipher texts we will get different system of quadratic polynomial equations, so in our public key the quadratic polynomials looks random. We are using a polynomial which has degree proportional to n. It is explained in [10] that in this case there does not seem to exist polynomial time algorithm to compute the Gröbner basis. Hence to attack our cryptosystem by Gröbner basis method is not feasible.
Relinearization, XL and FXL Algorithms
Relinearization, XL or FXL algorithms [9] , [17] are the techniques to solve the over defined system of equations i.e., ε n 2 equations in n variables, where ε ≥ 0. To attack the HFE cryptosystem, first the equivalent quadratic polynomial representation of HFE public key was obtained and then using the matrix representation of quadratic polynomials, they obtained O(n 2 )
polynomial equations in O(n) variables [9] . The Relinearization and XL or FXL techniques are used to solve this system of equations. Note that our polynomial is not quadratic, moreover the degree of our polynomial is not constant but it is function of n, so the attack of [9] is not feasible to our cryptosystem. Adversary cannot use directly Relinearization, XL or FXL algorithms to attack our cryptosystem because when number of equations are equal to number of variables, the complexities of these algorithms is 2 n .
EFFICIENCY OF THE PROPOSED CRYPTOSYSTEM
In this section we give complexity of the encryption and decryption of our cryptosystem.
Encryption
The public key in our cryptosystem consists of n equations of the form (2) . There are O(n 2 )
terms of the form x i x j in each n equations of the public key so the complexity of evaluating public key at message block 
Decryption
In the decryption of the proposed cryptosystem we need only one exponentiation namely . So the complexity of decryption is equivalent to Little-Dragon cryptosystem [3] , [8] . Note that for exponentiation in finite fields 2 n F there are several efficient algorithms, so the exponentiation can be performed very efficiently. The exact complexity of exponentiation will depend on the algorithm used.
CONCLUSION
We have designed an efficient multivariate public key cryptosystem. Like Little Dragon Cryptosystem the public key is mixed type but quadratic. Efficiency of our cryptosystem is equivalent to Little Dragon Cryptosystem. We have analysed our cryptosystem against all the known attacks and showed that our cryptosystem is secure.
